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Explaining Long Term Trends 
in Violent Crime 
Helmut Thome1 
Gurr and others have demonstrated that the long-term development of 
homicide rates in Europe follows a U-shaped curve: There is a fairly steady 
(though non-linear) decline since the 17th century (or even earlier, in some 
regions) till the middle of the 20th century, and a fairly steady increase since 
the 1960s. It is tentatively assumed in this article that the increase in the 
second half of the 20th century does not indicate a temporary deviation from 
the long-term trend but rather a trend reversal. Thus, a theory propounded to 
explain aggregated homicide rates must account for the secular decline and 
for the presumed increase as well. It is argued in this paper that Elias 's 
theory of the processes of civilization and Durkheim's theory on social 
differentiation and moral development offer a good starting point for con-
structing such a theoretical account. Based on an analysis of German crime 
data (1898-1902) some empirical evidence is presented to support 
Durkheim's hypothesis that the decline of violence follows from the erosion of 
«collectivism». 
Gurr et d'autres auteurs ont démontré que le développement des taux 
d'homicides sur le long terme suit une courbe en U : on constate un déclin 
assez constant (quoique non linéaire) depuis le XVIIe siècle (ou même plus 
tôt, dans certaines régions), et ce jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle, puis une 
baisse assez constante depuis les années 1960. On admettra, provisoirement, 
dans cet article que la baisse de la deuxième moitié du XXe siècle ne constitue 
pas une déviation par rapport à la tendance à long terme, mais un renverse-
ment de celle-ci. Par conséquent, une théorie visant à expliquer les taux 
agrégés d'homicides doit rendre compte aussi bien de la baisse séculaire que 
la baisse présumée. Dans cet article, on avancera que la thèse du processus 
de civilisation d'Elias et celle de la division du travail social de Durkheim 
constituent de bons points de départ d'une telle théorie. En se basant sur les 
statistiques criminelles allemandes (1988-1902), on présente quelques 
données à l'appui la thèse durkheimienne selon le déclin de la violence 
découle de l'érosion des solidarités collectives. 
1
 Helmut Thome is a professor of sociology at the University of Halle (Germany). His interests focus 
on research methods, long term development of crime, and solidarity structures. Among his articles 
published in English are : « Dubious cycles: a methodological critique of the Namenwirth/Weber 
thesis on cultural change with an introduction into filter design methods », Quality & Quantity 1996, 
30, pp. 427-448; « Party mandate theory and time-series analysis : a methodological comment, 
Electoral Studies, 1999, 18, pp. 569-585; «Solidarity: theoretical perspectives for empirical 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
S ince Gurr's seminal article2, the long term development of violent crime or, more specifically, homicide rates in Europe since the early modern age up to 
the (near) present has been depicted as a «U -shaped curve »: a non-linear but fairly 
steady decline over several centuries followed by an upward movement in the 
second half of the 20th century. Manuel Eisner has recently extended Gurr's work 
considerably by adding pertinent information derived from a series of studies 
carried out by various researchers who provided frequency counts of murder and 
manslaughter from various European regions in different time periods3. Eisner's 
data set includes some 290 single point estimates for the pre-statistical period. Thus, 
we now have a much better data base renderring the idiosyncracies of each study 
less influential in shaping the overall trend pattern. The U-shaped curve of the trans-
secular trend, however, has been confirmed. Gurr himself and several other histori-
ans of crime have interpreted the increase of homicide since, roughly, the 1960s as 
just one of several deviations around the persistently downward slanting trend, 
caused by local circumstances and short-lived forces. The task for the theoretician 
has been defined accordingly : explaining the secular decline of violent crime and 
short-term departures from it. In the present paper, however, I tentatively assume 
that the upward movement in the second half of the 20th century has initiated a long 
term reversal of the previous trend : higher and presumably still rising levels of 
violent crime will be with us for quite a while. This implies a redefinition of the 
explanandum. We have to search for theories that are able to explain both, the 
secular decline since the 17th century (or even earlier) and the (presumably) long-
term increase since the 1960s. We cannot content ourselves with a theory that 
explains the one and not the other. Historians of crime and criminal justice seeking 
an explanation for the downward trend have, above all, turned to Norbert Elias and 
his account of the « civilizing process » 4. As will be argued in the next section of the 
present paper, Elias's theory can also help to understand the trend reversal. 
Additional insights can be gained from another sociological classic, Émile 
Durkheim, as will be shown in the third section. 
2. THE CIVILIZING PROCESS 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIOLENT CRIME 
When in the mid-1930s Elias wrote his (now) famous book Ueber den Prozeß 
der Zivilisation including an «outline» of a theory of the «civilizing process» he 
did not intend to explain the long-term development of violent crime. But when his 
almost forgotten book finally gained world wide recognition in the 1970s, historians 
of crime and criminal justice became particularly impressed. As Johnson & 
2
 Gurr (1981), cf. Gurr (1989). 
3
 Eisner (1995; 2001). 
4
 Cf. Elias (1982). As Johnson and Monkkonen (1996, p. 4) note : « One of the most notable effects of 
the recent work on the history of crime... has been to force historians to reassess (or assess for the first 
time) the work of the sociologist Norbert Elias. Without a doubt, his work has gained the greatest 
respect of any single theoretician ». 
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Monkkonen note : «EIAS'S significance has come to be recognized in part because 
his descriptions of the 'civilizing process' match so well what crime historians have 
been finding » 5. Elias has been particularly impressive in demonstrating the dynamic 
interplay between various components of social structure, culture, and personality in 
the transition from feudal to modern societies in Europe. According to Elias, the 
major pacifying forces that have been unfolding in the long extended civilizing 
process (or processes) are the following : 
(1) The creation of the state monopoly of violence and its subsequent legitimation 
in the processes of democratization the second stage has often been neglected, 
and we even have to add a third stage, as I will argue later)6. 
(2) The extension of the market economy implying the elongation of action chains 
and increasing functional interdependencies between individual and collective 
actors. 
(3) The promulgation of a culture of non-violence, increasing condemnation of and 
even revulsion at the infliction of serious bodily harm including corporal pun-
ishment. 
(4) The transformation of personality structures in the direction of increased self-
control. 
All of these processes Elias has shown to be closely interrelated in a way that 
cannot be delineated in this paper. They are more or less cumulative and sufficiently 
continuous7 as to fit into a trend pattern that can be imagined to be inversely related 
to the secular decline of homicide rates. If used as an explanatory account for violent 
crime, the weakest element in this scheme, it seems to me, is the notion of affect 
control. Even if one assumes that the capacity of individual persons to control their 
aggressive impulses has increased and trickled down, so to speak, from higher to 
lower social strata (an assumption not shared by a number of cultural historians), 
this does not necessarily imply less killings. As Pieter Spierenburg has pointed out : 
«If increasing affect control, the taming of spontaneous drives and impulses, is 
indeed the dominant sociopsychological trend over the last seven centuries or so of 
European history, a high incidence of deliberate killings today would not be incom-
patible with it... (T)he proportion of 'killings in affect',(...), may have declined, 
while that of carefully premeditated murders may have remained stable or even 
risen » 8. There is also a severe conceptual problem involved in Elias's notion of 
affect control. When he explains why the disciplinary forces located in the develop-
ing state authorities and market institutions should have stimulated the formation or 
5
 Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, p. 4). 
6
 The state's monopoly of violence, of course, does not rule out the possibility that the « state » wages 
war against other states or against parts of its own populace. Criminal actions by the state (an impor-
tant subject in itself) are not considered in this paper. 
7
 This statement about the cumulative unfolding of a pattern is meant to be descriptive, I do not wish 
to subscribe to the evolutionary logic adopted by Elias. Although certain configurations may display 
the potential of systemic unfolding, the unfolding is unlikely to proceed in in a linear way. At its 
beginning, it is also unclear whether or not it leads to a state of equilibrium, dissolution, smooth 
transformation or violent transition to yet another configuration. 
8
 Spierenburg (1996, p. 69). 
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strengthening of internalized control patterns, Elias, at least in his original study, 
points to force («Zwang») and fear («Angst») as the prime mediators9. So he 
expressly claims that the adolescent youth will never advance to a sufficient regula-
tion of his behavior without experiencing «fear, arising from other human 
beings » 1 0 . Now, force and fear may produce strong super-egos, but weak egos; they 
promote rigidly controlled behavior, but may also become the seedbed of sup-
pressed neurotic energies waiting for an occasion to explode; they are likely to 
create authoritarian characters that may refrain from individual acts of crime but 
quickly unleash their suppressed emotions and turn to violence, if the state or 
another figure of authority legitimates or demands such action. The rise of totalitar-
ian regimes in the 20th century, particularly nazism in Germany, and, on a diffferent 
scale, the destructive consequences of sexual repression point to the limits of an 
internalized control pattern that has been implanted by force and fear11. Elias' theory 
of affect control therefore needs to be contrasted with another model of acquiring 
«moral competence» and flexible behavioral control, a model originating in the 
works of Piaget 1 2 and G. H. Mead : The learning of moral standards and the creation 
of a reflective self through participation in cooperative transactions between 
«equals »; the internalization of the control pattern of «dialogue» which is sup-
ported, in the political sphere, by public discourse and democratic institutions. 
Despite these shortcomings, the first three of Elias's generalizations mentioned 
above, may still be seen as foundational to any attempt to explain the long down-
ward trend in homicide committals since the 17th century. But what about the man-
ifold digressions from this trend, in particular the fairly steady increase in violent 
crime in the second half of the 20th century ? There is a strong evolutionary compo-
nent in Elias's theory, but he has always allowed for perturbances, temporary stops 
or turns, even phases of decivilization. There are problems of logical coherence 
involved in that, and there is a strong temptation to settle down with flimsy ad hoc 
explanations. But one path that one might follow, is traced out in Elias's reflections 
upon the shifting balance between the «I» and the «We», the weight and signifi-
cance accorded, respectively, to the «individual» and the « collective » components 
that are to be integrated within personal identities, a task on which one might 
succeed or fail - more or less 1 3. Underlying these considerations is the idea that 
various components of civilizing processes might move at different speeds, one 
9
 For a concise critique of this conception see Honneth, Joas (1980, pp. 115-123). 
1 0
 Elias (1980, vol. l , p . 4 4 7 ) . 
1 1
 Spierenburg refers to a rising or continuously high level of homicides within the biological family. 
He then offers the following interpretation: «If family homicide maintains a relatively stable level 
even today, this would be compatible with the theory of an increase in affect regulation. As affects 
and emotions were the subject of increasing constraints in the wider society, the nuclear family came 
to serve as an island where emotions were cultivated» (1996, pp. 71-72). Pushed to its logical end 
the argument may read : The family had to pay the psychological costs of the suppression of emo-
tions outside its bounds. Later in his work Elias has introduced the concept of «deformalization» 
intended to better account for the growing need of having more flexible structures of self-control. 
This new analytical element, however, has simply been added to rather than integrated with the old 
concept. 
1 2
 Piaget's critique (published in 1932) of Durkheim's ideas on moral education (stressing the role of 
hierarchy and disciplin) would be even more pertinent with respect to Elias's conception. 
13
 Cf. Elias (1991, pp. 209-315). 
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running ahead of the other that might catch up later (or, perhaps, not at all). For the 
more recent period, Elias has pointed to the changing role of the nation-state which 
has been losing its position as the highest-ranking « survival unit» while personal 
identities are still attached to it. This incurs strain and stress experiences which 
might easily be related to the concept of «anomie» as introduced by Durkheim. 
Elias seems to assume that reintegration on a supra-national, possibly world wide, 
basis would eventually be achieved. If we accept this evolutionary perspective, we 
are led to assume the recent increase of violent crime is a temporary occurrence. At 
present, however, I do not see any strong indicators that would support the hypoth-
esis that a world monopoly of power might be achieved in the foreseeable future. 
But if we discard the evolutionary component in Elias's theory, we may still use the 
more specific hypotheses to explain the presumed trend reversal. If, for example, the 
development of the state's monopoly of violence and its subsequent «domestica-
tion» within liberal democratic systems is chiefly responsible for decreasing inter-
personal violence, one should expect an increase of such violence, if the legitimate 
monopoly of violence is weakened or crumbling without being supplanted by func-
tionally equivalent forces. Several researchers have developed strong arguments 
and presented a number of indicators that lend credence to the hypothesis that the 
institutional nexus in which the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the state monop-
oly of violence were closely intertwined with each other has started to erode and will 
continue to do so. The German sociologist Trutz von Trotha speaks of a «oli-
garchic-preventive order of security »(OPOS) which has been emerging in Western 
democracies during the last decades1 4. It is characterized, among other things, by the 
remarkable growth of private security industries and services; moves towards pri-
vatization of prisons; the promulgation of communitarian control-orders ; the 
'mechanization' of policing. He notes that the newly emerging OPOS is without a 
« center », that the responsibilities of the political and administrative power centers 
have been replaced by the purchasing power of clients in security markets which 
transform the structures of economic inequality into the social inequality of differ-
entially available security. This commodification of security normalizes the use of 
violence which progressively penetrates into the web of social relationships15. The 
validity of v. Trotha's analysis cannot be discussed in this article, but note that the 
theses about a general «legitimation crisis» 1 6 and the dissolution of the functional 
prerogatives of the state1 7 have been with us for quite a while. In a recent book, Gary 
LaFree has linked the rising crime rates in the United States since the 1960s to a 
wide variety of indicators of diminished legitimacy of social, political, and eco-
nomic institutions18. The protest movements that called into question the legitimacy 
of «the system» in the 1960s were primarily politically and morally motivated (e. 
g., civil rights issues and the war in Vietnam in the USA, the insistence of the young 
generation to discuss responsibilities for the nazi-terror in Germany). A second, 
more powerful and still unfolding wave of delegitimation and diminishing state 
power has been set in motion by various technological innovations and economic 
1 4
 Trotha von (1995). 
1 5
 Trotha von (1995, pp. 157-159). 
16
 Cf. Habermas (1973). 
17
 Cf. Luhmann (1981). 
1 8
 LaFree (1998). See also Castells (1997) and Creveld van (1999). 
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developments now summarized under the heading of «globalization». In these 
processes a positive feedback system seems to have established itself in which 
diminishing control capacities of the nation-state undermine its legitimacy and sub-
sequently further diminish its regulatory powers 1 9. In particular, globalizing free 
market economies have undermined the state's monopoly of taxation, upon which -
to recall Elias - the monopoly of violence had been founded. On a more concrete 
level of analysis one would have to talk about the internationalization of organized 
crime, and about technological developments in weaponry and worldwide elec-
tronic communication that have put certain types of criminals into a rather advanta-
geous position over against the state. As a consequence, the state increasingly finds 
itself in a dilemma whereby it either has to let go or apply «big brother» strategies 
outside the legitimation boundaries. 
A second line of reasoning may elaborate upon Elias's somewhat deficient con-
ception of affect control and refine it into a multi-dimensional concept of self-
control, as suggested, fo example, by Gottfredson & Hirschi20. Eisner, drawing upon 
this improved concept, has advanced the hypothesis that in (post-)modern societies 
there is opening up a growing gap between the increasing demand for self control21 
and the diminishing ability of the individual person to acquire and supply self 
control. This hypothesis is compatible with Elias's theory and may even draw on it. 
Elias, remember, had linked the strengthening of self-control to the preponderance 
of long action chains rewarding those people that were able to delay satisfaction and 
plan their actions far ahead. This «long view » has become less functional in post-
modern «risk» societies (Beck), where future outcomes of personal investments 
have become rather unpredictable. Also, the protection of the « private sphere », a 
structural pre-requisite for developing strong self-control, seems to be crumbling, 
not by the intrusion of the state, perhaps, but by the transgressions of the mass media 
and business communications. These hypotheses would need more elaboration, of 
course, but at this point they are only intended to indicate how Elias's theoretical 
framework might be used to account not merely for the long downward trend in 
homicide but also to generate hypotheses aimed at explaining the presumed trend 
reversal. 
3. DURKHE1MIAN PERSPECTIVES 
3.1 Collectivism versus Individualism 
Additional insights are provided by another sociological classic, Émile 
Durkheim, who has been largely neglected or oddly misinterpreted by historians of 
crime2 2. He has been branded as a conservative thinker sticking to collectivist ideol-
19
 Cf. Castells (1997). 
2 0
 Gottfredson, Hirschi (1990). 
2 1
 Eisner (1995; 1997). Maybe this demand for self-control is not so much growing but becoming 
increasingly contradictory asking for highly self-disciplined behavior in the sphere of «production» 
and unfettered indulgence in the sphere of « consumption* (cf. Bell's thesis on the «cultural contra-
dictions of capitalism », 1976). 
2 2
 Charles Tilly's verdict about the « Useless Durkheim» (Tilly 1981) is utterly mistaken. 
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ogy. The opposite is true. Some 40 years before Elias wrote his book, Durkheim sug-
gested «that with the progress of civilization homicide decreases » 2 3 . The reason for 
this, he saw in the de-mystification of the collectivity and its devaluation relative to 
the « worshipping » of the individual. « Collectivism » he construed as an integrative 
pattern in which the group - the family, the clan, the caste, a religious community, 
the nation - was valued more, much more, than the individual and his well-being. 
This pattern had to break down in the course of increased social differentiation24. In 
collectivist societies the individual is enmeshed in a tightly woven web of symbolic 
references and intimations that easily arouse passions directed against those who fail 
to pay due respect to the norms and the honor of the group on which the honor of the 
individual member is dependent. He himself and his life count little. The collectiv-
ity takes on the quality of a sacred being demanding harsh reactions against those 
who step out of line, thereby creating a culture of violence. High levels of passion 
and low respect for the individual person render the individual more likely to phys-
ically attack another person. Although Durkheim notes in a very general way that 
« passion leads to violence » 2 5 , he does not construe the problem in terms of inner-
psychic control mechanisms. Rather, the passions are viewed as being directly reg-
ulated or molded by culture. The reason why passions are lower or more constrained 
in individualist cultures (though the collective sentiment may value the individual 
just as intensely as the group before) seems to be that the person who violates the 
norms (and is to be punished for that) is, so to speak, an incarnation of the very 
object which is now being worshipped, namely, the individual in general26. Thus, 
there is a shift in perspective: pacification is not effected by disciplinary forces 
holding down individual impulses but by freeing the individual from closely knit 
bondages that kept him tied into the collectivity. Durkheim believes, however, that 
it is not so much the rise of individualism that directly causes the reduction of homi-
cide committals but rather the erosion of collectivism (Durkheim 1992, 115). He 
has been lead to this conclusion mainly by empirical observations. He notes (from 
the data that were available to him) that while the homicide rate had been decreas-
ing, assault and theft (that also count as offenses against the individual person) had 
been rising at the same time. I think that we can dismiss this argument on method-
ological grounds : (1) As Gurr has pointed out 2 7, in the 19th century the increase in 
assault rates may be due to a growing sensitization towards even minor forms of 
inflicting bodily harm, which in turn stimulated reporting and prosecution. (2) If the 
upward trend had been real, this would still not disprove the notion that individual-
ist orientations contribute to lowering any forms of violent behavior. It could just be 
that, temporarily, other forces and motives conducive to violence had become 
stronger (like economic hardship, political conflict, or a rapid acceleration of social 
change). 
2 3
 Durkheim (1992, p. 113). 
2 4
 «(T)hose causes put together which, by increasing diversities of the members of all societies, have 
left them with no essential characteristics in common except those they get from their intrinsic 
quality of human nature. It is this quality that quite naturally becomes the supreme object of collec-
tive sensibility » (Durkheim 1992, p. 112). So, individualism is intrinsically related to universalism. 
2 5
 Durkheim (1992, p. 117). 
26
 Cf. Durkheim (1978). 
2 7
 Gurr (1989). 
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3.2 Some empirical evidence 
Durkheim's hypothesis about the relationship between collectivism/individual-
ism and murder has been confirmed by several cross-national studies2 8 using indi-
vidual level or aggregated data. I can now present additional evidence based on 
German data available for more than 800 districts (Land- and Stadtkreise) of the 
German Reich. Conviction rates for assault and battery (serious bodily harm) have 
been calculated per 100 000 legally liable persons more than 17 years old. The rates 
were averaged over five years from 1898 to 1902. For most of these districts the 
birth rates (number of births per 1 000 inhabitants) are also available, averaged over 
the years 1899 to 1901.I propose to interprete the birthrate as a correlational (not an 
analytical) indicator of the relative degree of collectivist versus individualist orien-
tation in a given district29. The higher the birthrate, the stronger the degree of col-
lectivist and the weaker the individualist orientation. Figure 1 presents the 
scatterplot and the regression line relating assault and battery (AB) to the birthrates 
of ca. 800 German districts. 
Figure 1 : Assault and Battery (per 100 000 legally liable persons) depending upon birthrate 
(per 1 000 inhabitants). (R-Squ.=0.37) 
The scatterplot demonstrates that 37 percent of the variation in AB can be 
explainted by birthrate. If we perform the same regression analysis for the somewhat 
less heterogenous Prussian districts (more than 500 cases), the percentage of 
explained variance increases to as much as 50 percent. For the Prussian districts we 
can add a number of structural variables in order to construct a simple path model 
with birthrate as the intervening variable. The regression results are presented in 
Figure 2. 
2 8
 See, for example, Karstedt (2001), Messner (1982). 
2 9
 I would not interprete the birthrates of contemporary societies in such a way. 
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Figure 2: Pathmodel relating exogenous variables and birthrate to assault and battery 
(Prussian districts) 
The structural variables are : the proportion of people who had enough income or 
other fortunes to pay a specific tax, ErgÂnzungsabgabe (TAX); the proportion of the 
labor force employed in industry (INDUSTRY); the proportion of the labor force 
working in public services or as professionals (PROFSERV); the proportion of 
catholics (CATHOLICS); a dummy-variable that differentiates between urban and 
rural districts (URBDUM); and a dummy-variable identifying those districts which 
were inhabited by a high proportion of people from Poland or the Baltic countries 
(FOREIGN). All these variables add only 4% to the amount of variance explained by 
birthrate alone. If on the other hand, we control for all these structural properties, the 
birthrate remains the most effective predictor with a standardized regression coeffi-
cient of ß = 0.54. The only other variables that remain statistically « significant», if 
we control for birthrate, are the indicator for relative economic prosperity ( ß = -0.13) 
and the indicator for ethnic conflict ( ß = 0.21). But they explain assault and battery to 
a much lesser extent than the birthrate. This result was not anticipated, I must admit. 
Thus, I offer a postfestum explanation, but I can only offer it in terms of Durkheimian 
theory : The result makes sense if we accept the birthrate as a cultural indicator for the 
relative weight of collectivist versus individualist orientation present in a given dis-
trict. They are connected in a number of ways that cannot be discussed here at length. 
For example, at the end of the 19th century outside the agrarian sector large numbers 
of children generally were no longer an economic «asset», the two-generation 
«nuclear» family was becoming predominant, emotional attachment between the 
spouses (derived from the partners's individual characteristics) and between parents 
and children were gaining more importance. In general, the individual (child) 
«counts» more, receives more attention and material rewards or investments, and 
develops a clearer conception of his own personal value as a human being, if the 
number of « equals » (siblings) around him is small rather than large30. So, my inter-
3 0
 The relationship probably is non-linear : the positive effects tend to be reversed, if there are not 
enough equals available for reciprocal exchanges. The one-child family, however, was still rare at the 
end of the 19th century. 
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pretation of birthrates can be defended in a three-step argument : First, those struc-
tural forces (like urbanization and economic development) that made for lower 
birthrates also promoted increased individualization (thus producing a concomitant 
viz. correlational relationship between the two). Second, lower birthrates themselves 
take on causal significance : families with less children offer better opportunities (to 
parents as well as to their children) for individuation. Third, even after « holding con-
stant» major structural variables and religious composition (cf. figure 2) birthrates 
uniquely account for 20 percent of the rather large variation in AB-rates that range 
from 34 to 1 074 convictions per 100 000 legally liable adults31. I simply do not see 
any alternative hypothesis (different from the Durkheimian interpretation) that would 
do a better job in explaining these crime rates32. 
It is certainly true (as one of the reviewers has critically remarked) that « a high 
birthrate... can be an indicator of a number of things». A positive hypothesis, 
however, should not be rejected before an alternative hypothesis has become avail-
able. I have examined two alternatives that one might think of. One might suspect, 
for example, that the birthrate confounds cultural patterns with demographic and 
other social characteristics like age and the sex-ratio. For some 35 large cities we 
can control for the sex-ratio given in the cohort of 25 to 34 year olds. The correla-
tion between birthrate and crime rate, however, is hardly affected, Pearson's r only 
drops from 0.69 (bivariate correlation) to 0.61 (partial correlation). One might also, 
secondly, consider the possibility that birthrates mainly reflect class composition, 
since the impoverished industrial proletariat (unskilled workers) had higher 
birthrates and, presumably, higher rates of violent crime than the middle classes, 
particularly in the cities. If this had been the case, the correlation between birthrates 
and AB-rates should substantially decrease once INDUSTRY is held constant. But 
this is not what happens. The correlation remains on a high level in our sample of big 
cities, even if the proportion of young males is added as another control variable. I 
have run some additional analyses with other controls, but the basic result has been 
maintained33. 
Another objection that was brought out by one of the reviewers refers to the 
famous «ecological fallacy» problem. This problem may arise if the theory is 
expounded on the level of individuals, but the empirical analysis is restricted to 
using aggregated data. In Figure 2 we have seen, for example, that there is a positive 
correlation between the proportion of Polish people living in certain German dis-
3 1
 Different practices of law enforcement, statistical recording and other factors contributing to the 
« production » of crime rates may have had a large share among the manifold idiosyncratic influences 
that must have caused this huge variation. Unfortunately, I do not have the data to explicitly control 
for these factors. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that they are strongly and system-
atically related to birthrate in ways remaining uncontrolled by the exogenous variables included in 
the model. 
3 2
 Interpreting decreasing birthrates as a cultural phenomenon is not entirely new, of course. Almost 
100 years ago, after a close examination of a number of alternative explanations, the famous German 
statistician and demographer Georg von Mayr arrived at the conclusion that the change in reproduc-
tive behavior resulted from a « conscious suppression of natural fertility« (bewußte Hemmung natür-
licher Vermehrung), which he thought was utterly deplorable, a kind of «social suicide« (Mayr von 
1917, pp. 116-126). His colleague, Friedrich Prinzig, explicitly argued that «purely egoistic 
reasons« were a major cause for limiting the number of children (Prinzig, 1901, p. 36). 
3 3
 The foregoing is just a small excerpt of a more comprehensive study. A fuller report of it is given in 
Thome (1999; 2002). The project was supported by a grant (TH 260/3-1) from the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft. 
EXPLAINING LONG TERM TRENDS IN VIOLENT CRIME 79 
tricts and the rate of violent crime registered there. This does not imply, however, 
that Poles are more likely to commit acts of criminal violence than non-Polish 
people. It might well be that the others (Germans in this case) turned more hostile 
where the Poles became more numerous. But a theory of ethnic conflict does not 
need to assume that either the majority (or ruling group) or the minority (or sup-
pressed group) would be more hostile than the other. As long as it only assumes that 
hostility (violence) rises (perhaps on both sides) if the group discriminated against 
grows bigger in numbers, the ecological fallacy problem does not arise at all : the 
level of theorizing concurs with the level of data analysis. Matters are more compli-
cated when we talk about elements of culture and individual attitudes. Though they 
are conceptually distinct from each other34, the assumption is that there is a close 
correspondence between the cultural and the «average» individual orientation. If 
«collectivism» (as a cultural pattern indicated by birthrates) is supposed to foster 
violence, one also assumes that on the attitudinal level the «collectivist is more 
inclined to commit acts of criminal violence than the «individualist»(holding other 
things constant). A positive correlation between the degree of collectivism 
(birthrate) and the rate of criminal violence, however, does not, on purely logical 
grounds, preclude the possibility that the «individualists» become more crime-
prone than the «collectivists» as the proportion of collectivists increases. I am not 
aware of any theory that would indeed make such a prediction for the end of the 19th 
century35. So, again, lacking a more convincing alternative it is legitimate to main-
tain the established (Durkheimian) theory which, after all, is consistent with the 
empirical observation. One might try to construe a counter-argument along the line 
that individualists might develop hostile feelings and turn to violent reactions 
against a disliked and predominant collectivist culture, but I see no sound empirical 
or theoretical foundation for such a hypothesis. If it were correct, the Durkheimian 
theory would need some modification and refinement, but even then, its basic 
proposition that « collectivism » promotes violence (including violent crime) would 
still be maintained. 
3.3 Moral versus Egoistic Individualism, and Anomie 
The erosion of collectivism, according to Durkheim, has paved the road towards 
a culture of non-violence3 6. But individualism is not a unitary, homogenous social 
type. It may degenerate into forms that are conducive to violence, albeit on a lower 
level. The « healthy » or « normal» type of individualism he calls moral individual-
ism. « Pathological» individualism is referred to as egoistic or excessive individual-
ism. The latter term alludes to a quantitative dimension involved here. Moral 
individualism, however, cannot simply be placed half-way between collectivism 
and excessive individualism, because all types of individualism differ from collec-
tivism by valueing the individual more than the group. Collectivism and individual-
ism are types of integration/differentiation. Durkheim adds another analytical 
dimension, regulation, on which he locates further pathologies : anomie refers to a 
3 4
 I have discussed these matters at some length in Thome (1981, pp. 54-76). 
3 5
 Later on, I will argue that in the second half of the 20th century, in a different structural setting, 
« excessive » individualism does promote interpersonal violence. 
3 6
 Durkheim, too, speaks of societies being more or less civilized. 
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lack of regulation, fatalism refers to over-regulation37. In the case of over-regulation, 
norms are too restrictive given the degree of social differentiation (and therewith 
type of integration) that has been reached; they are not accepted (legitimized) by the 
individuals. Figure 3 tries to represent this analytical scheme. 
Figure 3: Durkheim's Analytical Types 
The two dimensions (integration/differentiation and regulation) are analytically 
distinct but empirically related. Therefore, the two axes are not orthogonal to each 
other. Moral individualism is to be understood as an ideal-type which combines 
«regulation» and «integration» in an optimal way. As a theoretical perspective, 
moral individualism realizes that «individualism itself is a social product, like all 
moralities and all religions. The individual receives from society even the moral 
beliefs which deify him» 3 8 , moral individualism is the collective sentiment presup-
posed in organic solidarity39. As a social practice, moral individualism is founded 
on sentiments of sympathy and respect for others. Egoistic individualism finds its 
theoretical expression in utilitarian philosophy as represented in Spencer's work. As 
a social practice it is the rigorous pursuit of self-interest where (in the ideal-typical 
case) the individual uses other individuals as mere means to his own ends, a strategy 
which may incur high emotional costs as Durkheim makes clear in his discussion of 
egoistic suicide. Just like collectivism, egoistic individualism is particularistic 
3 7
 Cf.Besnard(1993). 
3 8
 Durkheim, Individualism and the intellectuals, quoted from Marske (1987, p. 11). 
39
 Cf. Giddens (1971, p. 480). The modern version of «moral individualism» that comes closest to 
Durkheim's is the social philosophy of «communitarianism» as proposed by Bellah, Etzioni and 
others in the USA - with important differences with respect to the conception of the state. 
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rather than universalistic. It is the illusionary denial of the sociability of man; it does 
not indicate a lack of regulation or orientation; rather, it is a delusion. Using 
Habermas's terminology, one might put it this way : If egoistic individualism prevails 
over moral individualism strategic action dominates over communicative action40. 
Anomie, on the structural level, is the 'forced division of labour' which prevents 
the individual from fully developing his capabilities and from working according to 
his faculties. On the level of personality, it is the failure, due to a lack of moral reg-
ulation, of the individual to constrain and reintegrate his diverse needs and desires 
which are stimulated and differentiated by a rapidly growing economy. He falls prey 
to his unbridled needs and desires, not knowing his proper place in society, and, as 
one might put it today : not finding a clearly delimited personal identity. Durkheim 
was wavering between the idea that pathological levels of anomie would be reached 
only in times of rapid social change (« acute » anomie) and the fear that the dynam-
ics of an increasingly unregulated economy and the ensuing «moral anarchy» 
would render anomie chronic41. Before looking at socio-structural arrangements that 
may promote anomie and excessive individualism, I will briefly consider the rela-
tionship between Durkheim's types of individualism and homicide. 
Durkheim has explained at some length 4 2 why the decline of collectivism should 
decrease homicide. He has also carefully spelled out why anomie and egoistic indi-
vidualism should be conducive to suicide. It is much less clear from his writings 
why pathological individualism should stimulate criminal activities including inter-
personal violence. He explicitly states that those socio-structural conditions which 
stimulate anomic suicide are also conducive to homicide. Egoistic individualism, 
instead, he assumes to be a stimulant only to suicide, not to murder43. But 
Durkheim's argumentation appears to be inconsistent on this point. If the egoist 
treats his fellow human beings primarily as a means to achieving his own personal 
ends, why should he not be motivated to inflict harm upon the other person, or even 
kill him, if he stands in his way (as practiced by contract killers viz. those persons 
that have hired them)? Gary LaFree (referring to work done by Steffensmeier) notes 
that in the United States «the rate of instrumental, felony-related killings (e.g., con-
tract murders) increases substantially during the postwar period (from about 7 
percent of all murders in 1960 to about 20 percent in 1990)» 4 4. Durkheim (at least in 
his suicide book) seems to overlook the possibility that murder, though it might be 
committed out of passion, could also be done cold-bloodedly or even out of 
boredom as well. Furthermore, anomie as well as egoistic individualism may stim-
ulate forms of a defensive, reactionary collectivism as exemplified in the activities 
of neo-nazi groups in Germany or the revival of religious fundamentalism in the 
USA (using, for example, violence against medical doctors who support abortion). I 
would even surmise, that the practice of capital punishment, the increasing number 
of executions in the USA since the 1980s also point to this «elective affinity» 
4 0
 Habermas (1981). 
4 1
 For a particularly careful study of Durkheims conception of anomie see Besnard (1993). 
4 2
 Cf. Durkheim (1992, chp. 10). 
4 3
 Durkheim (1951, pp. 358-359). 
4 4
 LaFree (1998, pp. 40-41). The promulgation of «instrumentalism» as the seedbed of barbarism 
within modern societies is a theme, of course, that has been prominent within various traditions of 
sociological and philosophical thinking (most notably, perhaps, within the Frankfurt School of social 
philosophy : Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Fromm). 
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between excessive individualism and reactionary (regressive) collectivism as a spe-
cific type of « over-regulation ». Due to the limitation of space I cannot pursue this 
issue any further here. I would rather like to take a brief look at the other side of the 
functional relationship with which Durkheim was concerned : What are the societal 
structures that foster moral individualism on the one hand or pathological forms of 
integration/regulation on the other hand ? And do we have reason to assume that 
anomie, excessive individualism, and reactionary collectivism are rising ? 
3.4 The Role of the State 
As for Durkheim, the most decisive role is played by the state in its relation to 
the economy. The state is «the organ of moral discipline» 4 5, but it is also the cham-
pion of individualism. Without the state, the individual could not have been set free 
from his primordial bondages, without the state there would be no power to protect 
the individual against the «tyrannic » claims of his group. Durkheim, by a review of 
history, is led to the conclusion that« except for the abnormal cases..., the stronger 
the state, the more the individual is respected » 4 6 . Durkheim expressly rejects the 
hegelian, the socialist and the utilitarian (liberal) conception of the state. What he 
had in mind was a democratic state whose power had to be limited by strong sec-
ondary groups, free social associations, that would mediate between the individual 
and the state. The state, however, should be strong enough to protect moral individ-
ualism from the onslaught of moral anarchy that was looming in the economic 
sphere threatening to intrude into other spheres of social life. The state should have 
adequate regulatory power to secure sufficient measures of justice, equity and 
equality considered to be structural pre-conditions without which moral individual-
ism could not be maintained47. 
So, looking back at Elias's theory, we have to add a third stage in the pacifying 
process of state formation : The monopoly of violence and political democratization 
(the rule of law and the generalized right to vote) had to be supplemented by social 
democratization, that is, by installing some form of the welfare state. In the 
European nations this development progressed into the 20th century and reached its 
climax in the late 60 s, early 70 s and has come under increasing attack since then for 
ideological, political and economic reasons48. This does not seem to fit neatly into 
the trend of homicide rates that started their upsurge earlier in the sixties. From a 
4 5
 Durkheim (1992, pp. 72,69) . 
4 6
 Durkheim (1992, p. 57). 
4 7
 Though Durkheim believed that anomie was not inherent in the advanced division of labor, he was 
deeply concerned about the 'crisis of (his) time'. He envisioned a situation in which anomie had 
become chronic and where government instead of regulating economic life would become its tool 
and servant (cf. Marske 1987, p. 9). Durkheim certainly overstated his case by assuming that there 
was no social fact without a moral fact, that each aspect of social structure was infused with moral 
meaning (cf. Fenton, 1984). But his insights into the functions the state must perform in order to 
maintain moral individualism and organic solidarity remain suggestive. - The problem of anomie 
could be re-phrased in terms of Habermas's ideas on the « systems of purposive action » encroaching 
upon («colonizing») the «life-world» of human beings, in other words the social arena in which 
individuals engage in communicative action to built up and preserve personal and collective identi-
ties (Habermas, 1981). 
4 8
 The role of the welfare state in holding down violent crime (or limiting its increase) has been docu-
mented by several cross-national studies, among them Gartner (1990); Messner, Rosenfeld (1997); 
Tham(1998). 
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methodological point of view, however, one has to consider the possibility that long 
term processes (like the restructuring of the relationship between the nation-state 
and the economy, the erosion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the monopoly of 
violence, increasing deficits in self-control) may have taken up where short-term 
processes stopped. With respect to short-term forces, Gurr has suggested4 9 that the 
first wave of increased interpersonal violence in the sixties was partly the result of a 
post-war baby boom which increased significantly the proportion of crime-prone 
young men. On the other hand, the large-scale societal transformations that might 
undermine « organic solidarity » and « moral individualism » had been on the move 
for quite a while before «Thatcherism» and «Reagonomics» came in, and the 
advances in electronic communication and economic globalization accelerated. The 
students' rebellion in the mid-sixties indicated a serious generational and political 
legitimation crises 5 0; «post-industrialism» led to changes not only in occupational 
structures, but also in life-style, gender relations and family structures; finally, the 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971 (that is, the abolition of the 
system of fixed exchange rates) already signaled the growing power of unaccount-
able and amorphous international financial forces5 1. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The postwar baby-boom, the political legitimation crisis (as indicated by various 
protest movements starting in the early 1960s), a slackening economy (with rising 
inflation and unemployment since the early 1970s) - all these (and some other short-
term) forces have cumulatively contributed to starting the upward trend in violent 
crime since the 1960s. But as such, they could not have effected a lasting reversal of 
the long-term trend that had gone downward for centuries. In order to predict or 
account for a lasting reversal of the trend, one has to look at more fundamental 
processes of social change, processes that have been summarized by various authors 
under such labels as «post-industrialism» (Bell), «high-modernity» (Giddens), 
« post-modernity »(Baumann), «risk society »(Beck),«information age» (Castells) 
and, in recent years most often, as « globalization processes ». 
Elias and Durkheim, both of them, offer clearly focused analytical frameworks 
that (despite of some conceptual shortcomings and outdated premises5 2) help to 
identify among the complexly intertwined processes of social change (and the 
welter of social theories that seek to describe and explain them) those elements and 
components that might be most relevant for understanding long-term trends in 
violent crime. Both point to the crucial role of the state, Elias emphasizing its 
control over the means of violence, Durkheim its general regulatory capacity, in par-
ticular over the economy. Both portray the (democratic) state as being instrumental 
4 9
 Gurr (1989). 
5 0
 Gary LaFree (1998) has made the loss of legitimacy of political and social institutions the key 
concept in has explanation of rising crime rates in the United States since the 1960s. 
51
 Cf. Taylor (1997, p. 286). 
5 2
 Obviously, Elias's and Durkheim's theories could easily be amended by insights from other socio-
logical classics, in particular Max Weber and Georg Simmel; and some of the shortcomings and 
flawed premises could readily be corrected by contemporary research and theorizing within various 
fields, including psychology and history. 
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in the progressive development of a culture of non-violence which, as Durkheim 
points out, decisively rests upon the state's capacity to insure a sufficient degree of 
justice and equality. Only the state has the capacity to balance personal freedom and 
equality. Elias and Durkheim characterize « modernization » as an ongoing process 
of «individualization» which both interprete as normatively desirable. Both point to 
discontinuities and imbalances inherent in these processes, and Durkheim envisions 
the possibility that moral anarchy and the powerful dynamics of the economy may 
eventually undermine the regulatory capacity of the state and the cooperative forms 
of « moral» individualism, thereby giving way to crime conducive forms of «egois-
tic» individualism and «anomie». 
Most economists and social scientists seem to agree upon the observation that 
inequality and social marginalization have generally been rising since the 1970s and 
will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the state's monop-
oly of violence and of taxation has been eroding, and its general capacity to regulate 
economic and social affairs in such a way as to maintain moral individualism seems 
to be dwindling. On a very general and abstract level of thinking, one might partic-
ularly note the following long-term processes as containing the potential for chronic 
forms of anomie : 
(1) The increasing pace of technological innovations and shortened production cycles, 
coupled with organizational reforms and personnel-turnover, lead to changes in 
our material and symbolic environments that develop faster than our capacity to 
make sense of them and to construe secure normative orientations towards them. 
The number of options from which we have to choose increases whereas the crite-
ria on which to base our choices become uncertain. And once we have managed to 
seperate the desirable from the desired, we discover that the number of desirable 
options is much larger than the time and material resources needed to realize them. 
The sense of «contingency» is thus promulgating and intensifying, fostering 
instrumentalist orientations and making it less likely to build up value commit-
ments that convey a firm sense of identity, orientation, and responsibility. 
(2) Mankind is not only perfecting the means to manipulate (and put in danger) the 
natural environment, but also the internal nature of the human species. 
Technologies are becoming available that allow for the manipulation of our own 
bodies : to reshape them, to interfere with the chemistry of our brains, the repro-
duction of our cells, the genetic outfit that we convey to our children, and 
perhaps, we will eventually be able to copy our own bodies and treat them as 
commodities. This will drastically change the conception of our selfs and of 
human dignity in general. Can we still «worship» (Durkheim) the individual 
whose feelings and sensations can be manipulated by technical means, and 
whose body can be repaired in almost all its parts ? If it were the case that a large 
majority of all the people in the world would opt for not going any further on this 
road, the systemic logic of a globalized free market economy would still push 
forward to continue in the same direction. This might be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, but it would still be anomie, worse than ever, perhaps. 
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